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14.1 Introduction
The value-added tax (VAT) is among the most widely used tax in-
struments in the world, and one which is often lauded for its efficiency,
simplicity, and ability to raise revenue. It is a very important source
of revenue in Europe, and its adoption is being debated in Japan. The
VAT has been considered in the United States on a number of occasions,
but has not yet been adopted. However, with the increasing pressures
of the budget deficit, the value-added tax is likely to be considered
once again in the next few years. The purpose of this paper is to examine
the likely consequences of adopting a value-added tax.
Textbook taxes almost always look good relative to taxes in the real
world, and this may partially account for the good reputation enjoyed
by the VAT. In this paper, we seek to learn more about VATs of various
sorts, by performing simulations with a computational general equilib-
rium model of the United States economy and tax system. Among the
questions we want to address are the following: (1) How efficient is a
flat, textbook-type VAT? (2) How are those efficiency properties af-
fected when a pattern of exemptions and rate differentials similar to
those used in Europe are incorporated? (3) How regressive is the text-
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book VAT, and how much of that regressivity is alleviated by the ex-
emptions and rate differentials? (4) How much of the efficiency ad-
vantage of a consumption-type VAT relative to our current income tax
is due to its flat rate structure and how much to its consumption base?
(5) What are the efficiency and incidence consequences of using the
VAT revenue to replace the corporate income tax rather than the per-
sonal income tax? (6) How different are the effects of using different
tax instruments to increase tax collections by a given amount? (7) If
the answers to the above questions suggest that the replacement of
some of our existing taxes with a VAT would be regressive but would
also be efficient (in the sense that it would result in a positive sum of
equivalent variations), for what types of social welfare functions would
the replacement be desirable? And finally, (8) How sensitive are our
results to some of the key elasticities and functional form assumptions
of our model?
We are going to assume that the reader is familiar with the basic
operation of a value-added tax. Those who are not are referred to
Lindholm (1976) or Aaron (1981). Also, our general equilibrium model
is well documented in Ballard et al. (1985). Therefore, in section 14.2
we provide only a very brief outline of the model. In section 14.3, we
provide an equally brief survey of the taxes we examine in this paper.
Section 14.4 presents our simulation results by examining the efficiency
and incidence effects of replacing a portion of the existing personal
income tax with a flat consumption-type VAT, a VAT with a European-
style rate structure, and a direct progressive expenditure tax. In section
14.5, we discuss simulations using VAT revenue to replace the cor-
poration income tax. In section 14.6, we consider alternative means of
increasing total federal tax receipts. Section 14.7 addresses the change
in social welfare resulting from the tax swap, while 14.8 reports on
some sensitivity analyses with respect to the structure of the underlying
utility function and the elasticity of saving with respect to the real
interest rate. We conclude with a brief summary of our results.
14.2 The Model
The model is a medium-scale computational general equilibrium
model, calibrated to 1973 data for the United States. We model 19
producer-goods industries that use capital and labor in constant elas-
ticity of substitution (CES) value-added functions. They also use the
outputs of other industries through a fixed coefficient input-output ma-
trix. Tax rates on labor and capital income for each industry are taken
from payroll, corporate, and property taxes. The 19 producer goods
are used indirectly for consumption through a fixed coefficient matrix447 The Value-added Tax
of transition. This matrix allows the 19 producer goods to be translated
into 15 consumer goods which correspond to consumer demands. There
are 12 consumer groups, differentiated by income class, each with an
initial endowment of capital and labor. These classifications are sum-
marized in table 14.1.
The data for the model are derived from five major sources. These
include the July 1976 Survey of Current Business, the Bureau of Eco-
nomic Analysis Input-Output Matrix, unpublished worksheets of the
U.S. Commerce Department's National Income Division, the U.S. La-
bor Department's 1973 Consumer Expenditure Survey, and the U.S.
Treasury Department's Merged Tax Files. Adjustments to these data
are made to ensure that each source is consistent with the others. All
data on industry and government uses of factors are taken to be fixed,
Table 14.1 Classification of Industries, Consumer Expenditures, and
Consumer Groups in the Model
Industries
1. Agriculture, forestry, and fisheries
2. Mining
3. Crude petroleum and gas
4. Contract construction
5. Food and tobacco
6. Textiles, apparel, and leather products
7. Paper and printing
8. Petroleum refining
9. Chemicals and rubber
10. Lumber, furniture, stone, clay, and glass




14. Transportation, communications, and
utilities
15. Trade












8. Clothing and jewelry
9. Transportation




13. Reading, recreation, miscellaneous
14. Nondurable, nonfood household
items
15. Gasoline and other fuels
Consumer Groups
(Households classified by $thousands of 1973 gross income)
1. 0-3 5. 6-7 9. 12-15
2. 3-4 6. 7-8 10. 15-20
3. 4-5 7. 8-10 11. 20-25
4. 5-6 8. 10-12 12. 25 +448 Charles L. Ballard, John Karl Scholz, and John B. Shoven
while data on consumers' factor incomes and expenditures are corre-
spondingly adjusted. Tax receipts, transfers, and government endow-
ments are fixed, and government expenditures are scaled to balance
the budget. Similar adjustments ensure that supply equals demand for
every good and factor.
The fully consistent data set defines a single-period benchmark equi-
librium in transactions terms. These observations on values are then
separated into prices and quantities by assuming that a physical unit
of a good or factor is the amount that sells for one dollar. All benchmark
equilibrium prices are thus $1, and the observed values are the bench-
mark quantities.
The equilibrium conditions of the model are then used to determine
the behavioral equation parameters consistent with the benchmark data
set. This procedure calibrates the model to the benchmark data, in the
sense that the benchmark data can be reproduced as an equilibrium
solution to the model before any policy changes are considered. In
order to implement this procedure, we specify the elasticities of sub-
stitution between capital and labor in each industry on the basis of
econometric estimates in the literature. Factor employments by indus-
try are used to derive production function weights, and expenditure
data are used to derive utility function weights. This calibration pro-
cedure ensures that, given the benchmark data, the various agents'
behavior are mutually consistent before we evaluate policy changes.
We use a tatonnement procedure developed by Kimbell and Harrison
(1984) to calculate prices which satisfy the following equilibrium con-
ditions: all profits are zero, and supply equals demand for each good
and factor. These conditions hold at each point in time. Single-period
equilibria are sequenced through endogenous savings decisions which
augment the capital stock of the economy. An exogenous labor force
growth rate of 2.89% is assumed.
For the benchmark sequence, we calculate a balanced growth path
that begins with our replicated data, has constant prices, and implies
quantities that all grow at the labor force growth rate. We then alter
tax parameters and calculate a revised sequence of equilibria. For both
the base case and revised case sequences, we calculate 21 equilibria
spaced 5 years apart. Thus, our calculations cover a span of 100 years.
At the end of this period, the economy has approached very close to
a new steady state in the revised case. We use the steady-state prop-
erties of the model to calculate "termination terms" that measure the
welfare changes through infinite time. See Ballard et al. (1985, chap.
7) for details.
In the revised case, we hold real exhaustive government expenditure
at the same level in every period as in the corresponding period of the
base-case sequence. We also hold transfer payments constant in real449 The Value-added Tax
terms for each of the consumer groups. (Thus, to the extent that the
VAT raises gross consumer prices, we protect consumers by increasing
their transfer payments.) This assumption that revenue yields are the
same period-by-period is a strong one. We do not consider the use of
debt finance to smooth the pattern of taxes over time. (See Goulder
1985 for a general equilibrium model with debt.) Another possibility
that we rule out is that society would alter the total amount of gov-
ernment spending over time if it were to become wealthier or poorer.
When a VAT is instituted, it raises revenues. In order to maintain
equal tax revenue yield in the manner described above, it is necessary
to reduce tax rates elsewhere in the economy. We most often do this
by reducing marginal income tax rates. We hold the rest of the tax rates
in the economy constant. Thus, we rule out the possibility that the
states would respond to a federal VAT by changing the configuration
of their own taxes.
The model assumes no involuntary unemployment of factors. Mar-
kets are perfectly competitive, with no externalities, quantity con-
straints, or barriers to factor mobility. Since we compute a complete
set of prices and quantities under alternative tax policies, we can es-
timate the change in national income, the changes in utility or income
for each consumer group, and new factor allocations among industries.
At any point in time, each household has a nested CES utility function
of the form
(1) U = U[H {X, L), CF)
where H is a CES function determining the allocation of current ex-
penditures between current consumption of goods, X, and current con-
sumption of leisure, L. The component X is itself a composite of the
15 consumer goods, which we shall call the Xh i = 1,. . ., 15. In earlier
applications of the model, purchase decisions on the Xt were deter-
mined by a Cobb-Douglas subutility function. In this paper, we make
an important change from the standard model by incorporating a Stone-
Geary or linear expenditure system of demands. U is another CES
function, determining the allocation of income between current expen-
ditures and expected future consumption,CF. The demand for CF re-
sults in a derived demand for savings.
An important advantage of the structure described here is that the
factor supply elasticities can be calibrated exactly to any desired value.
The most important of these is the elasticity of savings with respect to
the real net rate of return. The savings elasticity is very important in
simulating the VAT, because the adoption of a tax on consumption will
encourage greater saving. Since some of the largest distortions in the
model are those that affect the accumulation and use of capital, a
capital-deepening policy change will usually lead to welfare gains. These450 Charles L. Ballard, John Karl Scholz, and John B. Shoven
gains increase as the assumed savings elasticity increases, as we shall
see in section 14.8. Thus, it is important to use realistic values for the
savings elasticity. We use a value of 0.4 for most of our simulations,
and we also consider values of 0.0 and 1.0. Even this range of values
may be on the high side. In recent years, real rates of return have been
extremely high, and yet savings rates have changed very little. (See
Bernheim and Shoven 1985 for a discussion of some of the reasons for
the low level of responsiveness.)
It should be noted that there are some limitations with the model
structure we have described. Our decisions about intertemporal con-
sumption are governed by equation (1). In each period, our households
make a decision which allocates income between the present and the
future. There are not any life-cycle aspects incorporated into this de-
cision; in fact, our households are thought to live forever. Households
also expect the configuration of prices that exist in any given period
to continue throughout time. This assumption of myopic expectations
has been relaxed in a paper by Ballard and Goulder (1982). Their paper
examines the polar cases of myopic expectations and perfect foresight
and intermediate degrees of consumer foresight in a model with a sim-
ilar structure to that presented here. Ballard and Goulder find the results
or policy simulations are quite robust to variations in expectational
structure.
In computing the equivalent variation welfare measure with the stan-
dard model, we were able to make great use of the homotheticity of
the Cobb-Douglas demand function. Here we make similar use of the
homotheticity of the Stone-Geary formulation with respect to a "dis-
placed origin." Let 7, be the /th component of the displaced origin or
the minimum required level of consumption for commodity /. Then
define
(2) r = 2 Pt it
as the cost of the vector 7. The Stone-Geary demand functions are
then
(3) *, 7( +
where p, is the marginal propensity to consume commodity / out of
discretionary income. Given the Stone-Geary utility function
(4) Ux = f\(Xt - 7/)
Pi;S P/= 1.0
/=i 1=1451 The Value-added Tax
we calculate the indirect utility function
15
(5) Vx = (Ix - F) [I
and expenditure function
V
(6) h = -j + I
where
15
(?) A = n
i=i
We exploit the homothetic relationship between discretionary income
(lx - F) and the- indirect utility from consumption in excess of the
requirement. We use
as the price for the composite of discretionary consumption in the next
higher stage of the maximization process. In order to evaluate welfare,
we first compare discretionary H in the base case with discretionary
H in the revised case. We then compare the base case Fs and revised
case Fs.
1
14.3 Modeling of Taxes
In this paper, our simulations focus on three types of consumption-
based taxes. The first is an ideal flat consumption VAT, where the tax
base is the value of current period production less investment. All
expenditures/goods (other than leisure) are taxed at a uniform rate.
Against this idealized VAT, we model a more politically realistic
"stylized European VAT." The primary distinguishing characteristics
of the European VATs are the consumption base, the destination basis,
2
and differentiated rate structure. Based on the discussion of rate struc-
tures of the European VATs in Aaron (1981) and Cnossen (1982), we
model a destination-based, consumption-type VAT with rates ranging
from 0 to 15%. The rate differentiation is believed to be caused by a
number of political and practical considerations. Food and housing are
lightly taxed in an attempt to reduce the regressive nature of the VAT.
Services, particularly financial services, are believed to be particularly
difficult to tax. In all, as is illustrated in table 14.2, the average European452 Charles L. Ballard, John Karl Scholz, and John B. Shoven








































rate structure is far from the flat tax on consumption of an idealized
VAT. By comparing the flat VAT with the differentiated VAT, we can
determine the magnitude of the distortions in consumption decisions
caused by a differentiated rate structure. We can also determine the
effect that rate differentiation has on the gains or losses of the various
consumer groups.
Our model has a fairly high degree of disaggregation. Nevertheless,
at the 19-industry level of disaggregation, we are not able to capture
all of the intricacies of the VATs that exist in Europe. The tables pre-
sented in Scott and Davis (1985) show the enormously detailed tax
structures used in some of the European nations. For example, our
model does not distinguish between small firms and large firms in an
industry, even though it is often the case that firms of different sizes
are treated differently under the European VATs.
The third type of tax we examine is a progressive expenditure tax.
In order to compare this tax with a differentiated VAT, we assign the
tax rates in such a way that they will collect the same commodity-tax
revenue from consumers in the first period. This is achieved by im-
posing a progressive tax on consumers of consumption goods. Tax rates
range from 0.3% for the consumer group with the lowest income to
11.6% for the highest-income group. Under the differentiated VAT, each
consumer group faces the same rate schedule, with variation in tax
rates by consumption good. Under the progressive expenditure tax,
rates differ among the consumer groups, but for each consumer group,
tax rates are equal on all consumption goods.453 The Value-added Tax
14.4 The Consequences of Rate Differentials
We begin by reporting on the efficiency and equity effects of rate
differentiation with a VAT. We also compare the flat VAT with a pro-
gressive expenditure tax which has the same first-period yield. Table
14.3 shows the sum of equivalent variations for our 12 household groups
for the different policies. In all cases, it is the personal income tax
which is scaled back to preserve revenue neutrality relative to the base
case tax system. However, we look at two patterns of scaling the
personal income tax rates down—a multiplicative one and an additive
one. With the multiplicative scaling, each household's marginal tax
rate is multiplied by a constant less than unity so that revenue neutrality
is achieved. In the additive case, a common number of percentage
points is subtracted from each household's marginal tax rate.
The model has the capability of solving for these equal yield ad-
justment amounts. It also computes the flat VAT rate that is necessary
to generate the same first-period commodity tax revenue yield as the
differentiated rate structure shown earlier in table 14.2. This rate turns
out to be 6.52%. Since the same amount of extra commodity-tax rev-
enue is raised in each case, the amount of reduction in income tax
revenue is also the same. The pattern of changes in revenues is almost
identical after the first period, as well. In order to save computational
cost, we only hold first-period commodity-tax revenue exactly con-
stant. We do preserve overall revenue neutrality, however. If, in ad-
Table 14.3 Efficiency Gains for Progressive Expenditure Tax, Differentiated





Flat rate VAT (6.52%)
Progressive expenditure tax
















Note: Figures are percentages of the total present value of welfare. Numbers in paren-
theses are in billions of 1973 dollars.
aAll taxes raise the same amount of first-period commodity tax revenue from consumers.
Personal income tax rates are scaled back so that the pattern of total tax revenue is the
same in both the base case and revised case.454 Charles L. Ballard, John Karl Scholz, and John B. Shoven
dition to overall revenue neutrality, we had held the additional
commodity-tax revenue exactly constant in every period, we would
have generated nearly identical results.
Our interpretation of the results in table 14.3 is that the potential
efficiency gains from introducing a VAT or a progressive expenditure
tax are rather large. The gain from a flat 6.52% consumption type VAT
is 0.76% of the present value of economic welfare when multiplicative
replacement is used. Using a 4% real discount rate, the present dis-
counted value of future consumption plus leisure is $49 trillion, which
is definitionally equivalent to the total value of wealth, physical and
human, in the economy. Another way to assess the efficiency conse-
quences of the multiplicative replacement with a flat 6.52% VAT is to
note that the present value gain of $377 billion is equivalent to 29% of
GNP for 1973, the base data year. It should be emphasized that this is
a true efficiency gain, with the government having the same resources
available to it after the tax switch. Further, this efficiency gain is roughly
equivalent to the previously computed gain from integrating the cor-
porate and personal income taxes, and amounts to about two-thirds
the gain from completely switching to a progressive expenditure tax
(see Ballard et al. 1985, chap. 9).
The multiplicative rate adjustment, emphasized so far, results in
larger efficiency improvements than the additive adjustment because
it lowers the marginal tax rates for higher-income, higher-tax-rate
households more. The households with higher rates have already had
the allocation of their resources and labor supply distorted more, and
because these distortions increase approximately with the square of
the tax rate, their situations improve more per dollar of rate relief than
do the situations of those with lower initial tax rates. In fact, table 14.3
indicates that a 6.52% flat VAT would improve efficiency by slightly
less than one-half of 1% of the present value of welfare if the personal
income tax were scaled back additively (that is, with the same number
of percentage points of relief in marginal tax rates for all households).
This is just under two-thirds as large as with the multiplicative rate
adjustment.
Differentiation also is costly in terms of economic efficiency. In com-
paring the first two rows of table 14.3, one can see that the present
value of the cost of differentiation is just over $100 billion, which
amounts to 8% of 1973's GNP and 0.2% of the present value of future
welfare. The gain from a differentiated VAT with additive replacement
is only about half as great as the gain from a flat VAT with additive
replacement, and only about one-third as great as with a flat VAT with
multiplicative rate relief.
As we have modeled it, the progressive expenditure tax shares the
intersectoral neutrality of a flat VAT, but has a progressive rate structure455 The Value-added Tax
similar to the current personal income tax. Table 14.3 indicates that a
progressive expenditure tax with the same first period revenue as the
other two taxes would offer an increase in efficiency of roughly the
same magnitude as the differentiated rate VAT. One interpretation of
these results, then, is that rate progressivity and rate differentiation
cost roughly the same amount in terms of efficiency sacrifice relative
to a flat VAT. All of these results use the linear expenditure system to
allocate expenditures on commodities, and incorporate our base as-
sumptions of a saving elasticity with respect to the real interest rate of
0.4 and a labor supply elasticity of 0.15. In section 14.8, we examine
the sensitivity of some of our results to the saving elasticity and to the
LES functional form.
In interpreting the succeeding tables that deal with tax incidence,
several factors should be taken into account. Our dynamic model is
calibrated with cross-sectional data where households are differentiated
only by income. Because of the model structure and the fact that
households are not distinguished by age, we are unable to address life-
cycle or lifetime tax incidence questions. Rather, our incidence cal-
culations address the long-run gains and losses falling on households
in the various income classes. Households clearly move up and down
the income scale over the life cycle, so these calculations should not
be interpreted as gains or losses which fall on an individual household.
It has been suggested that, over the lifetime, our calculations overstate
the regressivity of taxes on consumption. This can most easily be seen
by noting there is considerably greater variation in the average pro-
pensity to consume in a cross-section data set than over consumers'
lifetimes. Since saving is more concentrated in higher-income classes,
consumption is more concentrated in lower-income classes, and this
results in the overstatement of the regressivity of consumption taxes.
Furthermore, since age is not an explicit dimension of our model, we
are not able to look into problems raised by Auerbach and Kotlikoff
(1983) which surround the transition from income-based to consumption-
based taxes.
It should be clear, however, that life-cycle or lifetime tax incidence
is not without problems of its own. Despite evidence of a great deal
of income fluidity among people who fall in and out of poverty, a general
consensus has emerged in support of transfer programs such as food
stamps and unemployment insurance. Similarly, the fact that low-income
people will receive higher earnings at other times in their career should
not mitigate the fact that the burden of consumption-based taxes falls
on individuals at times when they are least able to afford them, namely
when they are young and when they are old. This consideration would
obviously be less important if perfect capital markets existed, but until
we have capital market perfection we argue that lifetime and shorter456 Charles L. Ballard, John Karl Scholz, and John B. Shoven
time horizon (i.e., annual) tax incidence analysis is important for policy
makers.
These caveats should be kept in mind when interpreting the following
tables on tax incidence. Table 14.4 displays the personal incidence of
the six tax replacement policies discussed in table 14.3. The results of
table 14.4 show that there is an unpleasant tradeoff between efficiency
and equity with a VAT. In addition, the stringency of the tradeoff de-
pends a great deal on the method of personal income-tax rate adjust-
ments for revenue neutrality. The flat VAT is slightly more regressive
than the differentiated one. However, for the flat VAT, the multiplicative
replacement is significantly more regressive than the additive one. One
interpretation of this would be that the design of the rate adjustments
in the personal income tax is more crucial in terms of equity than is
the exemption of products that are deemed to be necessities. An ex-
ample of this is to look at two plans that are fairly close in terms of
economic efficiency. The flat VAT with additive rate adjustments is
much less regressive than the differentiated VAT with a multiplicative
method of rate adjustments.
The expenditure tax with a progressive rate structure illustrates many
of the same points. Recall that the efficiency gain from introducing a
revenue-neutral progressive expenditure tax is about the same as the
gain resulting from the differentiated VAT. However, the expenditure
tax has a much more progressive incidence. In fact, the progressive
expenditure tax with multiplicative relief from the existing income tax
yields a Pareto improvement in the sense that all our 12 household
classes are better off. As with the VAT introduction, the incidence is
very sensitive to the pattern of rate relief.
Table 14.5 shows the efficiency gains of flat VATs with different rate
levels. It displays the result that the gain from trading the existing
personal income tax for a flat consumption-type VAT exhibits a modest
degree of decreasing returns. The improvement from a 15% VAT is
somewhat less than three times the gain from a 5% VAT. Table 14.6
finds a similar pattern for the revenue-neutral introduction of a pro-
gressive expenditure tax.
14.5 Using the VAT Revenues to Lower the Corporate Income Tax
Despite the fact that economists have not reached a consensus re-
garding the nature of the corporate income tax, it is fair to say that it
is widely criticized. The criticisms are based on several grounds. First,
there is the double taxation of the return to capital, where net income
generated within the corporate sector is subject to tax at the corporate
level and then again at the personal level, either as a tax on dividends
or as a tax on capital gains.
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Table 14.5 Efficiency Gains from the Substitution of a Destination-Based
Consumption-Type Flat VAT for Some of the Personal Income Tax
Revenue (equal yield), for Model with Stone-Geary Commodity
Demands








Note: Figures are percentages of the total present value of welfare. Numbers in paren-
theses are in billions of 1973 dollars.
Table 14.6 Efficiency Gains from the Substitution of a Progressive
Expenditure Tax for Some of the Personal Income Tax Revenue
(equal yield), for Model with Stone-Geary Commodity Demands
Analog of VAT Rate











aThe progressive expenditure tax raises the same amount of first-period commodity tax
revenue as a consumption-type flat VAT of 5, 10, or 15 percent.
bFigures are percentages of the total present value of welfare. Numbers in parentheses
are in billions of 1973 dollars.
been held to reduce overall rates of return and hence inhibit capital
accumulation. Perhaps of greatest concern to the public finance econ-
omist is the nonneutrality of the CIT. The CIT obviously discriminates
against the corporate sector, as the noncorporate sector is free of this
form of taxation. Further nonneutralities are introduced by special
provisions in the corporate tax law. Finally, the corporate tax has a
bias toward debt finance, since only equity returns are subject to it.
Because of the problems with the CIT, various schemes of integrating
the corporate and personal tax system have been considered in the past
few years.
4 In this section, we examine the welfare effects of replacing459 The Value-added Tax
the corporate income tax with three different taxes: a flat-rate VAT, a
differentiated-rate VAT, and a progressive expenditure tax. One of the
first groups to advocate replacing the CIT with a VAT was a business
group, the Committee for Economic Development, in 1966. More than
a decade later, an extensive partial equilibrium analysis of the CIT-
VAT substitution was made by Dresch, Lin, and Stout (1977). Their
analysis explicitly concentrates on first-round, or impact, effects of the
CIT-VAT switch. Our analysis, being a general equilibrium analysis,
takes a somewhat different focus. We calculate the long-run, dynamic
welfare effects by consumer group, for three types of corporate tax
replacement. Despite the different focus, we are nevertheless able to
examine several of the issues raised by Dresch, Lin, and Stout. In
particular, they find that multiple-rate VATs do not mitigate the un-
derlying regressivity of the VAT. In fact, they claim that the allocative
distortions generated by differentiation eliminate many of the beneficial
effects of the CIT-VAT substitution. Finally, they suggest that the sub-
stitution of a progessive expenditure tax for the CIT would be worth
examination. The progressive expenditure tax would preserve many of
the desirable characteristics of the VAT that relate to investment and
trade.
In our model, personal taxes combine with corporate taxes to raise
effective tax rates in industries that are highly incorporated. Similarly,
taxes are reduced to the extent that each industry makes use of credits,
deductions, and allowances. It is important to note that, while our
model considers intertemporal and intersectoral distortions in the al-
location of capital, it does not include endogenous financial decisions
regarding debt/equity ratios or dividend payout ratios.
The policy program we investigate involves eliminating the corporate
income tax while modifying the personal income tax to tax total share-
holder earnings, rather than simply dividends. The increase in the rev-
enue raised by the personal income tax is not sufficient to compensate
for the elimination of the CIT. The amount of government revenue is
maintained by implementing a flat VAT, a differentiated-rate VAT, and
a progressive expenditure tax.
In tables 14.7 and 14.8, we present the efficiency gains in aggregate
and by consumer group for the different types of corporate tax re-
placement. The numbers found in table 14.7 are larger than the pre-
viously published estimates for corporate income tax integration where
the lost revenue was made up by raising the marginal rates of the
personal income tax. This is simply another demonstration that the
three tax replacements computed in table 14.7 are more efficient than
an incremental increase in the current income tax.
We find that a flat VAT is the most efficient replacement scheme and
that the progressive expenditure tax is the least efficient. However, the460 Charles L. Ballard, John Karl Scholz, and John B. Shoven
Table 14.7 Efficiency Gains from Replacing the Corporate Income Tax with
Different Types of Value-added Taxes (equal yield), for Model
with Stone-Geary Commodity Demands










Note: Figures are percentages of the total present value of welfare. Numbers in paren-
theses are in billions of 1973 dollars.
Table 14.8 Welfare Effects of Replacing the Corporate Income Tax with a flat
VAT, Differentiated VAT, or Progressive Expenditure Tax, by




























































The figures are percentages of the total present value of welfare.
differences in efficiency are relatively small. From table 14.8, we see
that there are modest distributional differences between the three meth-
ods of replacement. It is immediately apparent in all the plans that
there is a pronounced U-shape to the welfare results. The reason for
the U-shape lies on the sources side of the consumer's budget. The
distributional impact of the policy change is driven by the fact that the
capital/labor ratio of income is U-shaped across our twelve consumer
groups (see table 14.9). Since we eliminate the corporate income tax,462 Charles L. Ballard, John Karl Scholz, and John B. Shoven
the net return to capital rises sharply. Capital is also allocated more
efficiently, which pushes net returns up even further. The higher return
to capital naturally leads to U-shaped gains by consumer groups.
Removal of the CIT also has differing incidence effects arising from
the uses side of the consumer's budget. Low-income consumers tend
to spend a larger proportion of their income on consumer goods that
are produced by lightly taxed, capital-intensive industries, such as ag-
riculture and real estate. For example, the poorest consumer group
spends 42% of its income on food and housing, while the wealthiest
group spends 27%. Thus, removal of the CIT has a regressive impact
on the income distribution when viewed from the uses side of the
budget.
Differentiation of the VAT rates generates slightly higher welfare
gains for the bottom four income groups (38% of the population) and
the highest income group (5% of the population), although it is clear
from table 14.8 that the various consumer groups neither gain nor lose
much from differentiation. It should also be noted that we have a Pareto
improvement under both the VAT and differentiated VAT replacement
schemes.
The results for the distribution of welfare under the progressive ex-
penditure tax are quite different. Despite having a smaller total welfare
gain than the two VAT replacement schemes, the progressive expend-
iture tax yields welfare improvements for the first 9 consumer groups
(78% of the population) which significantly exceed the gains from the
VAT replacement schemes. This is a consequence of the progressive
nature of the expenditure tax rate schedule, under which the lowest
consumer group faces a marginal tax rate of 0.3%, while the highest
consumer group faces a rate of 11.6%. While significantly altering the
distribution of welfare results, the progressive expenditure tax yields
an aggregate welfare gain that is 0.1 percentage point smaller than the
gain that results from the flat VAT.
14.6 The Costs of Using Alternative Taxes to Increase
Government Revenues
Even the comparisons we have been presenting regarding the relative
efficiency and incidence of alternative forms of consumption-based
taxes and the use of the revenues may leave some readers without a
good impression of how important these differences are. Another pre-
sentation in table 14.10 may clarify the relative magnitudes. What is
presented is the private cost of increasing government receipts by 10%.
Thus, we have abandoned the revenue neutrality assumption that has
prevailed in all the previous results. Rather, the scale of government
expenditures and receipts is increased. What we examine is the welfare463 The Value-added Tax
Table 14.10
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Note: G = exhaustive government expenditure
T = government transfers
costs of the additional taxes, for different tax instruments. Exhaustive
government expenditures do not directly enter the utility functions of
our consumers, so consumer welfare is reduced by the higher taxes
but not increased due to the additional public goods. Since the extra
public goods are the same in the four cases examined, the relative loss
in welfare reflects the relative efficiency of the tax instruments. When
transfers are increased, the increased revenue is returned to the house-
holds. In this model, transfers are treated as lump-sum payments. So,
in the case of the third row of table 14.10, what is shown is the true
efficiency or resource cost of collecting the revenue.
What strikes us is the magnitude of the differences in the efficiency
numbers in table 14.10. The first row shows the figures for a 10%
increase in both transfers and exhaustive expenditures. With all four
incremental tax measures, the resulting revenue is the same. However,
a flat VAT "hurts" more than 25% less than a multiplicative increase
in the present income tax. In present-value dollar terms, the cost of
the permanent 10% expansion of the government ranges from $2,053
billion to $2,776 billion, depending on the design of the tax increase.
This strikes us as a nontrivial choice. The real resource cost of a 10%
increase in lump-sum transfers would range between $109 billion and
$237 billion, depending on the efficiency of the tax instrument used to
finance the increment. So, in this case, there is more than a two-for-
one difference. These results accord with the results from the paper
by Ballard, Shoven, and Whalley (1985), which used a very similar
version of this model to show that marginal excess burdens are fairly
large, and that the marginal excess burdens can differ fairly widely
among different tax instruments.
Table 14.11 displays the incidence of the cost of government expan-
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dence of a flat VAT is not dramatically different from that of an additive
surcharge to the income tax (as would be expected), despite the much
greater efficiency of the VAT. In this case, all households with incomes
greater than $4,000 (in 1973 dollars) would be better off with a flat VAT.
A differentiated VAT dominates an additive surcharge, in that all in-
come classes lose less in financing the expanded government.
14.7 Would the Substitution of a VAT Increase Social Welfare?
So far, we have measured the change in economic efficiency by
calculating the change in the sum of equivalent variations. The implicit
social welfare function is Benthamite, and the measure is in the tradition
of cost-benefit analysis. The linearity of the social welfare function
means that the social value of a dollar is the same for all households.
Of course, the social welfare function may display curvature. Following
Atkinson (1970), we look at the family of social welfare functions
12
(9) sw = -
where V, is the indirect utility of household /. We can compute social
welfare for both the revised and base distributions of V, for any par-
ticular value of p. The form is quite general, in that the limit as p goes
to infinity is the Rawlsian social welfare function where only the welfare
of the poorest household matters. For p = 0, the social welfare function465 The Value-added Tax
is Benthamite and therefore corresponds to the measure of economic
efficiency that we have been using so far. For p < 0, the social value
of a dollar is higher for those who are richer. Therefore, the range 0
< p < oo probably includes all values for reasonable social welfare
functions.
To examine the social welfare functions for which the tax swap is
desirable, we calculate the critical value of p for which the change in
social welfare is zero. The change in social welfare is given by
12 12
2 ryi-p V by l-p
(10) ASW = '" ' 1 - p 1 - p
where
 rV, is the value of indirect utility with the revised tax plan and
bVt is the value in the base case. The tax cases examined are the 6 on
which we initially reported in tables 14.3 and 14.4. The results are
shown in table 14.12. Two of the 6 cases result in an increase in social
welfare for all values of p. They are the differentiated VAT with an
additive adjustment in the personal income tax rates and the progressive















expenditure tax with a multiplicative adjustment. The flat VAT with an
additive adjustment results in an increase in social welfare if p is less
than 1.915. Despite its greater efficiency (gain in social welfare when
p = 0), the flat VAT with a multiplicative adjustment results in an
increase in social welfare only in the more limited range of p < 0.73.
The revenue-neutral introduction of a differentiated VAT with a mul-
tiplicative replacement not only results in a smaller gain in economic
efficiency than a flat VAT with a multiplicative replacement, but it also
increases social welfare for a more limited range of social welfare
functions. In the case of a differentiated VAT with a multiplicative
adjustment, social welfare increases if social welfare is of the form (9)
and if p is less than 0.60. The progressive expenditure tax, which is
unambiguously an improvement with a multiplicative adjustment, also
improves social welfare for all reasonable values of p in the case of an
additive adjustment (for all values exceeding -0.65). Our interpreta-
tion of these results is that a progressive expenditure tax would cer-466 Charles L. Ballard, John Karl Scholz, and John B. Shoven
tainly increase social welfare. A value-added tax with additive adjust-
ments in income tax rates would increase social welfare for a large
range of social welfare functions. The only exception would be in the
case of a flat VAT and a social welfare function that displays rapidly
decreasing social valuation of a dollar with increasing wealth. The
introduction of a VAT with multiplicative replacements, which offers
considerable gains in economic efficiency, may or may not increase
social welfare depending on the value of p.
14.8 Sensitivity Analysis
Up to this point, all of the results presented in this paper have been
based upon the model with Stone-Geary commodity demands. In ad-
dition, we have assumed that the elasticity of saving with respect to
the real net rate of return is 0.4. In this section, we perform sensitivity
analysis with respect to these assumptions.
First, as an alternative to the Stone-Geary specification, we present
results based on a Cobb-Douglas model of commodity demands. (This
Cobb-Douglas formulation was the standard formulation for earlier
applications of our model.) In table 14.13, we present the overall ef-
ficiency effects of the differentiated VAT, flat VAT, and progressive
expenditure tax in the Cobb-Douglas case. Table 14.13 can be compared
with table 14.3. For the flat VAT and the progressive expenditure tax,
the overall welfare gains with the Cobb-Douglas formulation are only
slightly less than the overall welfare gains in the Stone-Geary case.
This is not surprising, since these tax replacements have their greatest
effects on intertemporal consumption choices rather than on the allo-
cation of consumption among goods within any period. However, when
Table 14.13 Efficiency Gains for Progressive Expenditure Tax, Differentiated























Note: Figures are percentages of the total present value of welfare. Numbers in paren-
theses are in billions of 1973 dollars.
aAll taxes raise the same amount of first-period commodity tax revenue from consumers.467 The Value-added Tax
we consider the VAT with differentiated rates, the choice of model
makes a more significant difference. This is because the Cobb-Douglas
formulation implies that consumers have more elastic choices among
goods than would be implied by the Stone-Geary formulation. There-
fore, the rate differentiation causes more damage under the Cobb-
Douglas model. With additive replacement for equal yield, the differ-
entiated VAT generates almost no welfare gain in the Cobb-Douglas
case, versus a gain of $142 billion, or 0.28%, of welfare in the Stone-
Geary case. With multiplicative replacement, the differentiated VAT
does generate modest welfare gains in the Cobb-Douglas case, but these
are only about half as great as the gains in the Stone-Geary case.
In table 14.14, we present the distributional results of the simulations
presented in table 14.13. Table 14.14 can be compared with table 14.4.
Again, the results from the Cobb-Douglas model are very close to those
from the Stone-Geary model for the flat VAT and the progressive ex-
penditure tax. In most cases, the welfare effect is slightly less favorable
under the Cobb-Douglas model. When we consider the differentiated
VAT, however, the differences are somewhat larger for every group,
due to the greater elasticity of the Cobb-Douglas form.
Next, we return to the Stone-Geary formulation but incorporate sav-
ings elasticities of 0.0 and 1.0. The aggregate welfare effects are shown
in tables 14.15 and 14.17, and the effects for the various consumer
groups are shown in tables 14.16 and 14.18. As may be expected, the
welfare gains are always greater when the responsiveness of savings
is greater. For the range of parameter values considered here, the results
are moderately sensitive to the savings elasticity. For the flat VAT and
the progressive expenditure tax, the welfare gains are in the neigh-
borhood of 15% lower for the zero elasticity than for the elasticity of
0.4, and about 15-20% higher for the elasticity of 1.0 than for the
elasticity of 0.4. In the case of the differentiated VAT, the relative
differences are somewhat larger, in the vicinity of 25-40%.
Earlier in this paper, we emphasized the point that the method of
tax replacement for equal yield is often more important than the tax
change experiment itself. This point emerges forcefully once again in
tables 14.13, 14.15, and 14.17. In every case we have a substantially
greater aggregate improvement in welfare with multiplicative replace-
ment, since this involves relatively larger reductions in the highest
personal income tax rates.
The disaggregated results in tables 14.16 and 14.18 are fairly similar
to those from table 14.4. Nearly all of the groups do better under these
tax policy changes when the elasticity of savings is higher. The difficult
equity-efficiency tradeoff that we saw when looking at the VATs in table
14.4 is still very much present in tables 14.16 and 14.18. Once again,
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Table 14.15 Efficiency Gains for Value-added Taxes and Progressive
Expenditure Tax, for the Model with Stone-Geary Commodity





















Note: Figures are percentages of the total present value of welfare. Numbers in paren-
theses are in billions of 1973 dollars.
aAll taxes raise the same amount of first-period commodity tax revenue from consumers.
to higher aggregate welfare gains than does additive replacement, it
does so at the expense of even greater inequality. In addition, we see
once again that the progressive expenditure tax is distinctly more pro-
gressive than are the VATs.
14.9 Summary and Conclusion
In the introduction to this paper, we posed a series of eight questions
which this paper addresses. In this final section, we return to these
questions. We find that the adoption of a flat, textbook-type VAT leads
to modest welfare gains in the aggregate when equal revenue yield is
preserved by reductions in personal income tax rates. For our central
case simulations, the aggregate welfare gains are approximately one-
half of 1% of the total present value of welfare when additive reductions
in marginal income tax rates are used. When multiplicative replacement
is used to scale back income tax rates the gains are larger, approxi-
mately three-fourths of 1% of the total present value of welfare. This
illustrates a recurring theme of the paper, that the method of tax re-
placement can be just as important as the tax policy change itself.
For political and administrative reasons, the VATs adopted in Europe
have differentiated rates. We find that rate differentiation leads to sub-
stantial reductions (on the order of 25-40%) in the welfare gains from
adoption of a VAT. European governments have instituted differentiated
rate schedules for their VATs with the thought that differentiated rates
may reduce the regressive effects of the VAT. We find that rate differ-
entiation does indeed produce a less regressive distribution of welfare
gains and losses than those of a flat VAT. However, for three of theP. c 3 u
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Table 14.17 Efficiency Gains for Value-added Taxes and Progressive
Expenditure Tax, for the Model with Stone-Geary Commodity





















Note: Figures are percentages of the total present value of welfare. Numbers in paren-
theses are in billions of 1973 dollars.
aAll taxes raise the same amount of first-period commodity tax revenue from consumers.
four VAT simulations, the VAT is still a regressive tax-policy change.
5
In addition, rate differentiation leads to a variety of problems in admin-
istration and compliance. These problems are discussed at length in
Aaron (1981).
A progressive expenditure tax also leads to aggregate welfare gains
that are somewhat lower than those associated with a flat VAT. Com-
parison of these two tax policies suggests that roughly 60% of the
efficiency of a consumption-type flat VAT relative to our current income
tax is due to its consumption base. We also note that the progressive
expenditure tax yields a much more progressive distribution of gains
and losses than those generated by either type of VAT. In fact, with
multiplicative replacement, all income groups gain under the progres-
sive expenditure tax.
In section 14.5, we considered integrating the corporate and personal
income taxes, and replacing the lost revenue with either a flat VAT, a
differentiated VAT, or a progressive expenditure tax. This reform re-
duces both the distortions of the intersectoral allocation of capital and
the distortions of capital accumulation over time. We find that this
reform produces fairly substantial welfare gains regardless of the type
of replacement for equal revenue yield. These gains, in all cases, take
a U-shape. Under the flat and differentiated VAT, all groups gain.
When we remove the revenue neutrality assumption and allow the
level of government expenditures and receipts to increase, we find large
differences in the efficiency of the various tax policies. For example,
the cost to households of funding a 10% increase in transfers and
exhaustive government expenditures is 25% less if a flat VAT is used
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The attractiveness of the policies we examine ultimately depends on
the social welfare function one uses to evaluate the policies. We find
that a Benthamite would favor any of the policies summarized in tables
14.3 and 14.4, while a Rawlsian would advocate a differentiated VAT
with additive replacement or the progressive expenditure tax with either
additive or multiplicative replacement. Within this spectrum, it appears
that a flat VAT with additive replacement has a more progressive dis-
tribution than the differentiated or flat VAT with multiplicative
replacement.
We performed sensitivity analyses with respect to the specification
of commodity demands and with respect to the savings elasticity. The
Cobb-Douglas formulation is the more elastic of our two formulations.
Thus, we find the welfare cost of rate differentiation is higher than
when we assume a Stone-Geary formulation. We also find that, for each
of the tax substitution policies we consider, increases in the savings
elasticity lead to modest increases in the welfare gains.
Notes
1. For a more detailed discussion of these derivations, see Ballard and Shoven
(1985).
2. See Goulder, Shoven, and Whalley (1983) for a discussion of the equiv-
alence between origin-based and destination-based taxes.
3. We reject the argument that the corporate tax is simply a form of risk
sharing by the government (Gordon 1981), because it does not share propor-
tionately in the capitalization risk. Our position is consistent with the analysis
of Bulow and Summers (1984).
4. For an extensive discussion, see McLure (1979). Corporate tax integration
has also been simulated using an earlier version of the simulation model used
here. See Fullerton et al. (1981).
5. The differentiated VAT with additive replacement has a U-shaped welfare
distribution and the smallest aggregate welfare gain.
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Comment Harvey Galper
The Ballard-Scholz-Shoven paper is very much what we have come to
expect from the general equilibrium (GE) modeling work of John Shoven
and his colleagues: a useful and clearly presented application of an
impressive GE model containing simulation results of a range of policy
options, alternative ways of using whatever revenue is gained from
these options (maintaining revenue neutrality in today's jargon), sen-
sitivity of the results to alternative specifications of the model, and
along the way useful insights into what one learns from the general
equilibrium framework that might not otherwise be apparent. All this
and more are in this current paper, an examination of the efficiency
and incidence effects of various forms of value-added or consumption
taxes.
Since the publication of Ballard et al. (1985), the model is now ac-
cessible to everyone in full detail. The only significant change in the
version used in this paper is that a Stone-Geary linear expenditure
system has replaced the Cobb-Douglas commodity demand specifica-
tion for households (but even here sensitivity analysis of these alter-
natives has been performed).
Three kinds of consumption taxes are considered in this paper as
partial replacements for the current individual income tax: (1) a
European-type value-added tax where substantial variations exist in
the rate of tax among commodities; (2) a flat-rate VAT designed to raise
the same revenue as in (1) at a rate of 6.52%; and (3) a progressive
expenditure tax with marginal rates increasing from 0.3% at the lowest
consumption level to 11.6% at the top. The main efficiency findings
are not surprising.
First, the efficiency gains of these structural tax changes are not
trivial, ranging from 0.3% to 0.8% of the total present value of welfare
(itself equal to $49 trillion in this model). Second, the flat rate yields
the highest efficiency gain with the differentiated rate VAT and the
personal expenditure tax of lesser but about equal efficiency. Third,
actually one of the insights from GE modeling, how the revenue from
a VAT is used to reduce other taxes is as important as the particular
kind of consumption tax that raises the revenue in the first place. A
proportionate reduction in all income tax rates (multiplicative change)
yields greater efficiency gains than a constant absolute rate reduction
(additive change) because the very highest and most distorting marginal
tax rates are reduced more.
1
Harvey Galper is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution.
1. Differential effects depending upon how the government uses the new revenue (or
makes up the lost revenue in the case of tax cuts) were also emphasized in GE simulations
performed by Fullerton and Gordon (1983).476 Charles L. Ballard, John Karl Scholz, and John B. Shoven
Up to this point, the results are not dissimilar to those derived from
this model earlier—e.g., chapter 9 of Ballard et al. (1985). The new
wrinkle here is that with these current simulations the model is used
to address directly the efficiency-equity tradeoff of various forms of
consumption taxes. Specifically, the simulations display for each al-
ternative tax regime the change in tax incidence for each of the twelve
consumer groups in the model. The authors are correct to focus on the
equity issue. From a policy perspective, it is the critical issue in the
consumption tax debate. And yet I feel that the approach adopted here
is something of a disservice to the cause of consumption taxes, despite
the fact that my own particular favorite—the progressive expenditure
tax—seems to score highest on equity grounds.
I will explore in more detail my reasons for this view, but in any
event the model makes clear the direct tradeoff between efficiency and
equity. Despite overall efficiency gains, the simulations show that a
VAT, in general, makes the lowest-income classes worse off and the
higher-income classes better off. Only the progressive expenditure tax
reverses this pattern, with one variant actually yielding a Pareto-superior
outcome that improves the welfare of all income classes.
Other simulations show the efficiency and equity effects of inte-
grating personal and corporate income taxes and making up the revenue
lost from this proposal with either the flat or differentiated VAT or a
progressive expenditure tax. These changes generally yield efficiency
gains approximating 1% of the present value of welfare. On the equity
side, gains are realized for all consumer groups, but the key finding is
the U-shaped pattern of welfare gains by income class. This reflects
the underlying U-shaped distribution of the capital income-labor in-
come ratio, another indication of the problem introduced by the inci-
dence measures used in this paper.
I will make two comments on this work. First, the particular simu-
lations presented here lead me to want to see one more experiment
simulated with this model. This is what might be called the European
compromise: raising taxes by means of a more regressive tax such as
the VAT in order to support more redistributive social spending. Spe-
cifically, the simulation I have in mind is to use the proceeds from the
VAT to both (1) compensate by direct transfers the lower-income groups
who lose from the VAT and (2) reduce income tax rates multiplicatively
across the board. One could then show that the redistributive effects
shown in the paper are not inevitable; or, even more pointedly, that a
specifically redistributive use of the proceeds must accompany any
VAT to counteract the tendency to welfare losses among lower-income
groups. But even this experiment does not address a fundamental prob-
lem of the incidence calculations, my second and more substantive
comment.477 The Value-added Tax
As Harberger (1978) noted in discussing an earlier version of this
model, all models are partial equilibrium models in the sense that they
cannot, in fact should not, fully replicate all elements of the economy.
The "partial equilibrium" elements of this model have often been al-
luded to by the authors here and in other work and include the failure
to incorporate firm financing decisions, household portfolio choices,
and potentially significant international capital flows. Perhaps most
important for the current application, however, and indeed the partic-
ular point about which Harberger was most concerned, is whether this
model tells us anything useful about issues of income distribution. This
question is important because the application presented here is the first
use of the GE model that attempts to examine specifically the equity-
efficiency tradeoff. All earlier applications concentrated on efficiency
gains or revenue considerations, and kept equity concerns deep in the
background (Ballard et al. 1985, chaps. 8-11).
But with the incidence of alternative tax regimes brought so much
to the fore, it is logical to ask whether the distributional measures used
are adequate to the task. My answer to this question must be in the
negative. The reason for this assessment is that the paper employs a
measure of the distribution of income at a single point in time, the year
1973, as the benchmark for determining how particular consumer groups
in the economy will fare over a period of sequenced equilibria extending
100 years into the future. In other words a one-year snapshot of the
income distribution is the standard for determining long-term tax in-
cidence. According to this model, as the economy expands over time
due to productivity growth and capital accumulation (forget pure pop-
ulation growth), each taxpayer group simply expands its labor and
capital income along the base-case balanced growth path. Neither the
ratio of capital to labor income (with an exception to be noted below),
nor consumption relative to income exhibit any life-cycle tendencies
for the 12 consumer groups. Each income class observed in 1973 is
assumed to be in long-run life-cycle equilibrium.
None of this is, of course, true, nor is it news to the authors. They
not only recognize this snapshot problem but, in fact, have informed
me that they correct for at least one of the most obvious manifestations
of it, namely the negative saving of the lowest-income class. If this
class were simply continued forward through time for 100 years, it
would soon exhaust its capital assets and not be able to continue con-
sumption. To forestall this result, the authors allocate each period's
capital accumulation among income classes, not according to each
class's own saving, but according to its stock of capital. That is, ag-
gregate capital accumulation is equal to the sum of the saving of each
income class, but the distribution of this new capital is proportional to
the distribution of existing capital. The rationale for this assumption is478 Charles L. Ballard, John Karl Scholz, and John B. Shoven
that there is some movement of individuals among income classes so
that the 1973 snapshot cannot really represent a long-term income
distribution. Despite this ad hoc assumption to deal with one specific
aspect of the snapshot problem, the fundamental issue is not addressed.
Basing incidence on a one-year pretax income distribution misses
two separate effects: first, an initial cohort or transition effect empha-
sized by Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1983); second, the long-term inci-
dence of the new tax rules once these rules have been in effect for the
entire lifetime of each taxpayer. Even assuming that the two effects
can be separated, and the Auerbach-Kotlikoff work does not provide
great grounds for optimism here, this model is clearly in the spirit of
long-term incidence rather than short-term adjustments. In general,
transition issues have not been the focus of the Shoven-Whalley GE
work.
The questions then become: how closely does the 1973 income dis-
tribution represent lifetime income distributions and how closely does
one-year tax incidence represent lifetime tax incidence? There is much
evidence suggesting considerable bias in the incidence results and,
perhaps more important, bias that makes consumption-based taxes
appear much more regressive than they actually are. For this reason,
it is particularly important that in the policy debate we move away
from one-year incidence measures to lifetime incidence measures, while
still recognizing that initial cohort or transitional effects must be care-
fully considered in any regime change.
The first piece of evidence on the snapshot problem comes from the
data used in this model itself. The U-shaped capital-to-labor income
share, as noted, and the low and negative saving of the lowest-income
classes reflect a mixture of cohort (that is life-cycle) effects and dis-
tributional effects within cohorts. Capital income is a relatively high
share at the low end of the income scale because these classes are
made up in substantial part of retired people with little labor income
who are drawing down capital assets to sustain their consumption and
hence have low saving. At the top of the income distribution are, those
at the peak of their earning years who have also accumulated many
financial assets preparatory to retiring a few years hence. In the middle
are younger households just starting to accumulate assets.
A few observations from the March 1985 CPS data on 1984 incomes
give similar results a decade later. When households are arrayed by 11
income classes by age of head, the following conclusions emerge: (1)
For the three lowest-income classes ($0-$5,000, $5,000-$10,000,
$10,000-$ 15,000), the modal age group is 65 and over (with 34%, 43%,
and 31%, respectively, of all households in the class). (2) For the next




















Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-60, No. 149,
Money Income and Poverty Status of Families and Persons in the United States: 1984
(Advance Data from the March 1985 Current Population survey), (Washington, D.C.
USGPO, 1985), table 13, p. 19.
$30,000) the 25-34 age head is the modal class. (3) In contrast, for the
top income class ($75,000 and over) the modal age group is 45-54, and
for the next two highest-income classes ($40-$50,000 and $50-$75,000)
the modal age group is 35-44. (4) Furthermore, for ages up to the age
group 45-54, median household income increases substantially before
declining for the age groups 55-64 and 65 and over (see table 14.19).
A recent article by Davies, St-Hilaire, and Whalley (1984) makes this
same point regarding the contrast between cross-section and life-cycle
income distributions in Canada, and the resulting effects on the inci-
dence of consumption-based taxes. They find that income is much more
evenly distributed on a lifetime basis than on an annual basis, and the
distribution of components of income change markedly as well. For
example, the distribution of transfers is much more concentrated in
lower-income groups in annual data than in lifetime data, comprising
over 44% of income for the lowest two deciles for annual data, but
never more than 15% of income for any decile for lifetime data. Sim-
ilarly, consumption of income is much more evenly distributed on a
lifetime than on an annual basis. These results imply, therefore, that
the incidence of consumption taxes is much less regressive on a lifetime
basis.
What is the solution to this problem for the current model? I am not
sure I have a good answer here. In my work with Eric Toder on house-
hold portfolio choice (1984), we have much the same problem if we
wish to examine distributional effects. Observed portfolio holdings re-480 Charles L. Ballard, John Karl Scholz, and John B. Shoven
fleet both cohort effects and distributional effects within each cohort.
For analytical purposes these two effects must be distinguished.
The most conceptually satisfying procedure is a full overlapping gen-
erations model, but, even short of such a major restructuring, some
changes are needed if equity-efficiency tradeoffs are to be adequately
examined. One possible solution may be to separate out age cohorts,
perhaps by the 6 age categories used in the CPS table (14.1), for each
household income class. Distributional data can then be displayed sep-
arately for each cohort.
In the context of the current GE model, this would still require some
care in interpreting the simulations. One would certainly not want to
interpret the results as representing what a household currently headed
by a 25-year old would look like in 100 years when the head is 125.
Instead, the results may be taken to represent the taxes a household
of age 25 head would pay 100 years from now if regime 2 rather than
1 had been in effect over this entire period. Also, with the results for
each age cohort displayed separately, one could either use a particular
cohort, such as the 35-45 age group, as the basis for making distri-
butional judgments, or else use a social welfare function that weights
each age cohort as well as each income class within an age cohort. In
any event, by distinguishing across-cohort and within-cohort distri-
bution effects, incidence measures would be more comprehensive and
useful than those presented in this paper.
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